Firms gain visibility and shareholder base by establishing economic relationships with reputable trading partners. We find that supplier firms enjoy a boost in news coverage and a subsequent reduction in advertising expense when they disclose trading relationships with large and well-known customer firms. After relationship establishment, supplier firms are more likely to be held by the same institutional investor and covered by the same analyst following their customer firms. We show that managers are aware of this effect and selectively disclose relationships that benefit their firms' visibility. Our findings highlight the role of product-market network as an important channel through which small and young firms gain investor recognition and improve their operating environment.
Introduction
Merton (1987) shows that when assets under investors' radars differ between one another, investors will optimize their portfolio holdings by using the subset of securities they know. As a result, stocks known by more investors are in higher demand and therefore should, ceteris paribus, have higher value. Motivated by this theory, existing empirical research has validated the predicted relationship between investor recognition and firm value. For example, an increase in a firm's investor base has been linked to subsequent stock price appreciations in the the U.S. market (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999) and the Japanese market (Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno, 1999) . Building on research in consumer bias, Green and Jame (2013) find that firms with short and easy-to-pronounce names generally have a higher breadth of ownership and valuation ratio.
1
Given the extant evidence that a higher degree of investor recognition is desirable from a firm's perspective, managers are incentivized to influence their firms' visibility. For established firms, maintaining and improving investor recognition can be achieved through heavy advertisement spending (e.g., Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004; Lou, 2014) and investor relations (e.g., Bushee and Miller, 2012; Solomon, 2012) .
2 However, for smaller and younger firms, gaining investor recognition through costly advertisement and investor relation programs may prove challenging. This is because small and young firms are often financially constrained; meanwhile, they suffer from prohibitively high external financing costs precisely because they are not well-recognized by investors (Chemmanur and Yan, 2009 ). This leads to a "chicken or egg" dilemma because they can neither raise external capital without sufficient investor recognition, nor invest in investor recognition program without sufficient capital. As a result, small and young firms must explore alternative channels through which they can gain investor recognition without massive spending in advertisement or investor relations. This paper shows that the economic network of firms, i.e., companies they do business with, is an important channel through which they acquire investor recognition. We argue that small and less visible firms, especially those in upper stream industries, are able to gain investor recognition by establishing product-market relationships with well-known customers. The following example is an intuitive epitome for our main argument. Watts Water Technologies, a company that makes plumbing and heating products, voluntarily disclosed Home Depot as its important customer in its 2001 fiscal year annual report, after which we 1 Using household-level data from Sweden, Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) find support for Merton's (1987) theory by showing that the return premium on less recognized firms is related to the shadow cost of incomplete information.
2 Large, publicly traded companies often have dedicated IR officers (IROs), who oversee most aspects of shareholder meetings, press conferences, private meetings with investors, (known as "one-on-one" briefings), investor relations sections of company website, and company annual reports.
observe a jump in its press coverage from 2001 to 2002 (see Figure 1) . 3 The news coverage of Watts Water Technologies continually increased in the following years as the company gained exposure via its product-market relationship with Home Depot. In fact, the news media recognizes this important relationship as evidenced by the published article on June 5, 2006 by Dow Jones News Services, "Watts' products can be found everywhere from the plumbing aisle of the local Home Depot Inc. (HD) store, to waste water treatment plants in China."
[ Figure 1 about here]
We generalize the notion in the example above by identifying customer-supplier relationships in the Compustat Segment Customer File from 1980 to 2009, where a firm has to disclose sales to its important customers. We define a firm as a principal customer if its existence is reported by a supplier firm in the database. Given that relationships in the database are between dependent suppliers and their principal customers, customer firms are generally much larger and more well-known than their supplier firms. This makes the relationships database that we construct suitable for examining how a supplier firm's degree of investor recognition is affected after it discloses a new relationship with an important trading partner. Using this empirical setup, we examine three important issues. First, we document various pieces of evidence showing that smaller and less visible supplier firms gain significant investor recognition by establishing trading relationships with larger and more visible customer firms. Second, we show that managers are cognizant of this recognition transfer channel and manage it by selectively disclosing names of companies that benefit their firms' visibility. Third, we show that the increase in firms' investor recognition via the product-market relationship substantially improves their operating environment.
In order to show that less visible firms gain significant investor recognition via the product-market relationship, we start by documenting changes in a supplier firm's visibility following its newly established customer-supplier relationships. We use the number of newspaper articles written on a firm in the Factiva database as a proxy for the firm's level of visibility with investors (Fang and Peress, 2009) . We find that after the supplier firm discloses its relationship with a principal customer firm, its news coverage level increases tremendously. The magnitude of news coverage increase on the supplier firm is economically significant. Results from the regression analysis suggest that relative to a similar firm in the same industry, the level of news coverage increase is about 9% per year for each principal customer that it shares an economic partnership with. Focusing our analysis exclusively on top news sources (e.g., Wall Street Journal, New York Times, USA Today, and Reuters News) yields a similar result.
To further pin down the direct effect of product-market relationships on firms' visibility, we examine changes in supplier firms' news coverage that result from their customer-supplier relationships. For this analysis, we restrict our sample to news articles where both the supplier firm and its principal customer are mentioned in the same text. We refer to this joint coverage as the customer-related news on a supplier firm and estimate its relative change at the customer-supplier relationship pair level. We find that, on average, customer-related news coverage level increases by about 3.7% per year (t-stat of 5.5) after the supplier firm discloses their relationship. This magnitude, however, substantially increases if we focus on highly visible customer firms.
4 That is, all else equal, a highly visible customer firm brings 17% more news coverage for the supplier firm. Next, we explore the impact of supplier firms' newly disclosed relationship on institutional cross-holdings and analyst cross-coverage. Using the institutional holdings data from the 13F filings and analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S, we find that shares of a supplier firm are more likely to be held by institutional investors of its principal customers, and the supplier firm is more likely to be followed by analysts covering its principal customers. Our tests are carried out in a sample where previously established institutional holdings and analyst followings are removed. Therefore, our results come directly from new cross-holdings and cross-coverage.
Given that supplier firms' visibility depends on companies they reportedly have economic ties with, it is natural to ask whether managers are aware of this effect, and thereby selectively disclose relationships that benefit their firms' visibility. To verify this we make use of the marginal cut-off in the disclosure requirement enforced in the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 14. Before 1998 firms were required to disclose the existence and names of external customers representing more than 10% of their total revenues. However, in practice, we find that customer firms making up less than 10% of a supplier firm's total revenues are often voluntarily reported. We compare characteristics of customer firms that motivate their suppliers to voluntarily disclose their existence against those that are reported in compliance with the SFAS No. 14 rule. We restrict our attention to customer firms that are at the margins, i.e., +/-1%, of the 10% cut-off rule in order to ensure that they are, on average, of equal importance to the supplier firm's cash flow. We find that between voluntarily and involuntarily disclosed customer firms, the former has significantly higher levels of press coverage, institutional ownership, and analyst following. For instance, the number of news articles per year written on a voluntarily reported principal customer firm is about 32% higher relative to a principal customer firm that marginally met the 10% cut-off disclosure requirement. We find consistent results when we look at other dimensions of investor recognitions. Specifically, institutional ownership and analysts following of voluntarily disclosed principal customers are, respectively, 10 and 12 percent higher relative to those that are mandatorily disclosed. Overall, we find strong evidence suggesting that managers are cognizant of how their firm's trading relationships influence the degree of investor recognition that their firms receive.
Our last set of empirical tests examine whether the proposed channel of investor recognition diffusion, i.e., economic network based on supply chains, substantially impacts supplier firms' operating environments. We examine three avenues. First, we show that the increase in supplier firms' visibility, as an outcome of establishing relationships with well-known customers, is related to a significant decrease in their advertising expenses in the year following their reported relationship. Interestingly, despite the decrease in advertising expenses, we find that supplier firms benefiting from increased visibility experience a significant increase in total sales to non-principal customers. These findings suggest that the impact of the economic network on a supplier firm's visibility, which is by nature indirect, can substitute for ones obtained through direct advertisement channels in terms of attracting consumer and investor recognitions. The second economic impact that we examine is how the increase in supplier firms' visibility fundamentally mitigates information asymmetry by lowering the cost of external financing. Myers and Majluf (1984) , among others, suggest that the negative announcement effect of SEOs is associated with the information asymmetry between firms and investors. Consistent with the notion that investor recognition fundamentally improves the information environment and mitigates information asymmetry, we find that the SEO announcement effects of supplier firms are significantly less negative than their peers without principal customers. Finally, we examine how the reported trading relationship of a supplier firm affects its likelihood to be listed on option exchanges. Following the method in Mayhew and Mihov (2004) , we find the likelihood that exchanges will list options on a firm's equity increases by threefold after it reportedly becomes a dependent supplier of a publicly traded firm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the contributions of our paper in relation to the existing literature. Section 3 describes the data, and sample selection. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence that suppliers gain investor recognition through the economic network. Section 5 discusses the economic outcome of improved investor recognition. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relations to existing literature and contributions
The findings of this paper are related to several strands of literature. The first is the channels through which firms acquire investor recognition and increase their shareholder base. For instance, Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find that product-market advertising increases the breadth of stock ownership, while Chemmanur and Yan (2009) and Lou (2014) find that firms' product-market advertising improve their equity valuations. Similarly, Bushee and Miller (2012) find that managers of small and less-visible firms could successfully improve their firms investor following through investor relations (IR) programs. We contribute to this literature by showing that relationships between firms in the product market are an important channel through which supplier firms, especially those that are smaller and younger, can improve their visibility and investor following. We emphasize that the channel of recognition acquisition that we introduce is through the product-market network. Unlike previous studies, firms do not gain investor recognition by increasing communications with their potential investors, e.g., advertising or IR programs, but rather through the peer effect of being a trading partner of a larger and more well-known firm.
Our paper is related to the broader literature on the factors influencing investment decisions of institutional investors (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001) , as well as coverage decisions of financial analysts (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; De Franco, Hope, and Larocque, 2014) . We contribute by showing that new investment decisions of institutional investors, and new coverage decisions of sell-side analysts are influenced by the product-market relationship. These findings suggest that the universe of stocks under an investor's radar can be shaped by the new relationship established in the product market. Interestingly, our findings that institutional investors tend to cross-hold firms that share product-market relationships are rather counter-intuitive from a risk-management perspective. This is because investment in firms in the same supply-chain network likely exacerbates the portfolio's systemic risk. Similarly, our finding that analysts tend to cross-cover customer and supplier firms sharing a product-market relationship is somewhat surprising because customer and supplier firms usually belong to different industries, while analysts are incentivized to become an industry specialist due to the All-star industry ranking (e.g., Boni and Womack, 2006; Fang and Yasuda, 2014) .
5 Thus, we show the firms' product-market relationship provides an explanation to the seemingly counter-intuitive behaviors of why institutions cross-hold systematically linked firms and why analysts cross-cover stocks from different industries. Our paper is also related to the growing literature documenting the impact of economic relationships on firms' values and corporate decisions. 6 We find that supplier firms benefiting from the increase in investor recognition through the product-market relationship experience substantial improvement in their operating costs, such as lower advertising expense. Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find that firms with larger advertising expenditures have a larger number of institutional investors. We find a similar effect when a supplier firm establishes a relationship with a principal customer firm; all this occurs without the need for extra advertising expenses to attract new investors. Finally, the findings in this paper contribute to the literature documenting the information flow within economically linked firms. Existing studies find that various types of information percolate along the supply chain, which include equity returns (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008) , bankruptcy risk (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008) , the likelihood of merger and acquisition (e.g., Cen, Dasgupta, and Sen, 2013; Ahern and Harford, 2014) , corporate innovation (Chu, Tian, and Wang, 2014) , and the probability of managerial turnover (Intintoli, Serfling, and Shaikh, 2014) . We add to this literature by showing that the product-market relationship is a vital channel for supplier firms to gain investor recognition.
Data construction
SFAS No. 14 (before 1998) and SFAS No. 131 (after 1998) require firms to disclose the existence of sales to individual external customers representing more than 10% of total firm revenues. In practice, a firm can voluntarily identify principal customers who account for less than 10% of total revenues. 7 We define a firm as a principal customer, or as PC in short, if it has been reported as a customer of one or more supplier firms in the Compustat Segment Customer File. Similarly, a firm is defined as a dependent supplier if it has one or more principal customers in the database. All supplier firms identified in the database are public companies. However, corporate principal customer firms can be private or public firms. Following the same approach used in Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008) 6 Existing studies have documented the influence of peer effect on the capital structure decision (Leary and Roberts, 2014) and dividend policy (Popadak, 2012) .
7 Although SFAS No. 131 does not require firms to disclose the names of principal customers after 1998, most suppliers continue to do so in their 10-Ks. Our paper provides an explanation to why firms may voluntarily disclose their customer names. Also, Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012) provide a detailed discussion on the proprietary costs of disclosing customer names.
Our news data is obtained from Factiva. We collect news items in two steps. In the first step, we create a mapping between the Compustat/CRSP firm identifiers (i.e., GVKEY for Compustat and PERMNO for CRSP) and the Factiva firm identifiers (i.e., Factiva IDs) by matching company names. We only keep companies that exist in all of these three databases. In the second step, we collect news items for the matched companies between 1980 and 2009. We restrict our search to news items in English and exclude republished news and recurring pricing or market data. For each news item, we obtain information on news headline, news date, word count, and news source.
We obtain analyst forecast data from the unadjusted Historical We also use SDC Platinium of Thomson Reuters to find information on seasoned equity offerings of securities. In addition to the databases mentioned above, security characteristics, such as stock return/price, return volatility, stock turnover, firm age, and momentum are retrieved from CRSP. Firm characteristics, such as book to market, return on assets, book leverage, book value of equity, and dividend yield, are collected from Compustat. Detailed definitions of variables used in our study can be found in Appendix C. Table 1 reports the summary statistics on firm characteristics and institutional holdings. Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for institutional holdings. On average, the financial institutions have relatively stable holdings in their portfolios. The average holding age is about half of the fund age. On average, Quasi-Indexer funds are bigger than non QuasiIndexer funds. Quasi-Indexer institutions form 53.4% of our sample of institution-quarter observations.
Panel B of Table 1 presents a few firm characteristics of three samples: all Compustat firms, dependent suppliers and principal customers. We report mean, median, and standard deviation of all firm characteristics that are used as control variables in our empirical tests. Our comparison suggests that principal customers tend to be larger and older firms that have more extensive media and analyst coverage and higher levels of institutional holdings relative to an average Compustat firm. On the other hand, dependent suppliers tend to be smaller and younger firms that have less extensive media and analyst coverage and lower levels of institutional holdings relative to an average Compustat firm. For example, a typical customer firm's market capitalization is $6.9 billion vs. an average market capitalization of $992 million for a typical supplier firm. Customer firms are mentioned on average 882 times per year in the news while the supplier firms are mentioned on average only 77 times per year.
9 In a similar vein, customers are followed on average by 11 analysts while the corresponding number for an average supplier firm is only 5.59 analysts. Given the differences in firm characteristics, it is not surprising that we observe a lot of reputable large firms, such as WalMart, Apple, AT&T, Microsoft and Google, in customer firms. However, most suppliers are unknown to us. Both the comparison based on firm characteristics and the eyeballing of customer and supplier lists hint to the possibility that suppliers can benefit from the investor recognition of their well-known principal customers by being involved into the economic network of these large customers.
We argue that relationships with reputable PCs can improve suppliers' investor recognition. One potential concern is that suppliers selected by reputable PCs might have better performance than other firms ex-ante and, therefore, would have a higher level of investor recognition irrespective of whether they are chosen by reputable PCs or not. The summary statistics in Panel B clearly rule out such a possibility. For example, selected suppliers have lower profitability (i.e., ROA) and dividend yield than an average firm in Compustat. In an untabulated test, we run a formal selection test for supplier and we find no evidence that firms with better operating performance are more likely to become suppliers for reputable customers. This result is perhaps not surprising given that reputable customers have a superior bargaining power and firms that can survive and grow by themselves may not be willing to work with reputable customers.
It is important to point out that dependent suppliers and principal customers are of mutual importance to each other. Specifically, for an average dependent supplier firm, the mean sales to principal customers account for 28.7% of its total sales; for an average principal customer firm, the purchases from dependent suppliers account for 1.27% of its costs of goods sold (COGS) 10 . Therefore, investors are likely to view the concrete and important customersupplier relationships as a credible economic network, which would facilitate the "diffusion" of investor recognition along the supply chain.
[ Table 1 about here]
Economic network and investor recognition
In this section, we focus on documenting evidence of investor recognition transfer through supply-chain relationships. In subsection 4.1 we show evidence of better press coverage for supplier firms with (versus without) principal customers. In subsection 4.2 we study the portfolio selection decisions of financial institutions and show an institution is more likely to include a supplier firm's stock in its portfolio if the institution holds at least one of the customers in its portfolio. Finally, in subsection 4.3 we conduct a similar exercise on the decision of a financial analyst to cover a supplier firm and show that a supplier firm has better higher likelihood of being covered by a financial analyst if the analyst has experience with the customers of the supplier firm.
News coverage
We examine the change in news coverage level on a supplier firm after its economic relationship with a principal customer (PC) is estabalished. We define the first year that a supplier firm establishes its relationship with a PC as the event year (or year zero). Table 2 reports the means of relative changes in news coverage on a supplier firm from event year 1 to event year 8. We report two measures of relative change in news coverage. The first is the simple difference N k − N −1 between the number of news articles in the k th year after the PC establishment and the year before the PC establishment. The second measure is the log percentage change in news coverage calculated as ln
The results in Table 2 clearly suggest that the PC establishment has an immediate impact on the news coverage of supplier firms. On average, a supplier firm is covered by 59 news articles (N −1 ) in the year before the PC establishment. This number increases to 66 (N 0 ) in the PC establishment year. This effect is both economically and statistically significant. Looking at the log percentage change in news coverage, the magnitude of increase is about 14% in the first year with a t-stat of 9.76. Further, it is also clear that this increase continues after the PC establishment. Specifically, the news coverage keeps increasing as the PC relationship continues to develop.
[ Table 2 about here]
To account for the impact of other factors affecting news and media coverage (e.g., Fang and Peress (2009)) and to remove the time trend of news coverage associated with particular industries, we conduct a multivariate analysis with time and industry fixed effects. First of all, we properly measure the PC duration to reflect the fact that one supplier firm may have multiple principal customers. We use both a value-weighted PC duration and an equalweighted PC duration. Value-weighted duration is a sales-weighted duration of individual PC durations based on sales to all principal customers for that supplier. Similarly, equalweighted PC duration uses equal weights for individual PC durations. Secondly, for each supplier firm, we create a benchmark non-PC firm based on industry affiliation (i.e., twodigit SIC industries) and firm size (i.e., total assets) using propensity score matching.
11 Our main variable of interest is a difference-in-difference news coverage variable for supplier firm i with principal customers, defined as
represents the percentage change in news coverage on the supplier firms between k years after and the year before PC establishment, and the news coverage change for the matched non-PC firm represented by ln
We regress ∆N i,mf,k on PC duration variables to understand the impact of the PC relationship on supplier firm's news coverage using the following model
where we use both value-weighted and equal-weighted durations for PC-duration. Following the determinants of media coverage in Fang and Peress (2009), we include several control variables in year k to control for other dimensions of the firm characteristics, such as sales (ln(Total Sales)), analyst coverage (Analyst Coverage), analyst forecast dispersion (Analyst Forecast Dispersion), institutional ownership (Institutional Ownership), stock return volatility (V olatility), book leverage (Book Leverage), book-to-market ratio (B/M ), and return on assets (ROA).
The results are reported in Table 3 . In general, the coefficients on PC duration in different specifications are all statistically significant and economically meaningful. For example, from column (2) the coefficient associated with value-weighted PC duration is 0.083 (tstat=3.22). This represents the marginal impact of PC duration on supplier's news coverage after controlling for the other factors affecting news coverage and industry-specific time trends in news coverage. One additional year of PC duration corresponds to an 8.3% increase in news articles covering the supplier firm, relative to other firms without PCs. Translating into raw number of news articles, this represents an average increase of 5 more news articles covering the supplier firm, relative to the pre-PC establishment year. The results of using equal-weighted PC duration in columns (3) and (4) are very similar to those in columns (1) and (2).
[ Table 3 about here]
Note that the results in Table 3 use news coverage from all sources in Factiva. To further understand the impact of PC on the visibility of supplier firms, we conduct additional analysis using news coverage from Factiva's top sources only. The main idea is that news articles from top news sources have much broader dissemination than a regular news source, and this will have a much larger impact on improving the visibility of supplier firms than other news articles. Specifically, Factiva's top sources include the major news and business publications, such as Wall Street Journal, New York Times, USA Today, Washington Post, LA Times, ABC News, Barron's, Bloomberg Business Week, Chicago Tribune, CNBC, CNN, Forbes, Market Watch, NBC News, New York Post, Time, Reuters News, Dow Jones News Services, Associated Press Newswires, Business Wire, and PR Newswire. We re-run the regressions as in Table 3 and report the new results in Table 4 . As expected, having PCs does improve supplier firm's news coverage from top news sources. From column (2) of Table 4 , we can see that the coefficient on value-weighted duration is 6.1% (t-stat=2.49). Note that in the pre-PC establishment year, the average number of top source news articles is 27. Therefore, one additional year of PC relationship represents around 2 more news articles from top sources on the supplier firm, relative to the pre-PC year. This marginal impact is still economically large, representing roughtly 40% of the marginal impact from all news sources (5 from previous analysis in Table 3 ). The results based on equal-weighted duration are similar and reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 .
[ Table 4 about here] Overall, the above empirical results suggest that having long-term principal-customer relationship is a very important channel for supplier firms to gain visibility through more news coverage, especially the coverage from top news sources that have broad readership. Further, our results suggest that the positive effect of relationships with PCs on news coverage is persistent after relationship establishment.
To ensure that suppliers' increase of media coverage is indeed driven by relationships with principal customers, we conduct a test based on textual analysis. We search through the news articles for the supplier firms and only keep those that actually have their customer names mentioned. Then we try to understand the impact of PC duration on this customer-related news coverage. Since each supplier firm may have more than one customer, we conduct this analysis at the customer-supplier pair level, in contrast to the supplier level in the previous two tables. More importantly, at the customer-supplier pair level analysis, we can identify which customers are more visible than others and further test the importance of customer visibility on improving the supplier visibility.
This analysis involves 1,656 customer-supplier pairs and 11,124 customer-supplier-year observations. We define customer-related excess news coverage as
where N i,k,pc (N i,−1,pc ) denotes the number of supplier i's news coverage mentioning its customer name pc in the k th year after (or the year before) the PC establishment. Unlike the previous analysis, we cannot create a matching non-PC firm here since the non-PC firm does not have a customer name identified by definition. We use the following model for this analysis and also control for time and industry fixed effects:
where Famous Customer is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if this customer's top source news coverage is among the top 5% of all customers in year k and 0 otherwise.
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The results are presented in Table 5 . The coefficients on PC-duration is around 3.6% and highly statistically significant (t-stat over 5), suggesting the customer-related news coverage increases by 3.6% for one additional year of PC-relationship. More interestingly, from column (4) we can see that the coefficient associated with Famous Customer is 16.9% (t-stat=2.65), suggesting that having a famous customer increases a supplier firm's famous-customer-related news coverage by 16.9%, equivalent to the effect of more than 4 years of a PC relationship.
Institutional holding
In this subsection we study the effect of the customer-supplier relationship on the portfolio decisions of the institutions. We study institutional investors for two reasons: First, financial institutions are a group of sophisticated investors, and previous studies suggest that they have a higher ability and a faster speed in processing information than retail investors.
15
Showing the role of customer-supplier relationships on institutional holdings would be the most direct evidence that product-market-based economic networks affect investor recognition. Second, thanks to the disclosed information in 13F filings, we are able to identify the quarterly holdings of institutional investors. Therefore, data are available for us to test whether institutional investors with customer knowledge are more likely to invest in suppliers after the relationship establishment. Specifically, if suppliers indeed gain investor recognition through economic networks with PCs, institutional investors, particularly those with customer knowledge, should be the first group of investors reacting to the changes in product-market-based economic networks.
To test the hypothesis mentioned above, we form triplets of Supplier, Institution, Quarter. Our sample includes 196,548,763 triplets. For each triplet we construct a dummy In Portfolio which takes 1 if the institution is holding the supplier firm in that quarter and zero otherwise. We also construct another dummy, Cus Exp, which takes the value 1 if the institution holds any of the supplier's PCs during the quarter. As a robustness test, we form a continuous variable, Pct Sales, which is defined as Pct Sales = i∈ customers in the institution's portfolio Sales to Customer i Supplier's Annual Sales .
Since the decision of which securities to hold in an institution's portfolio is affected by both institutional characteristics and an individual security's characteristics, we control for both sets of characteristics in our tests. We pick these control variables in the spirit following Gompers and Metrick (2001) . In addition, we introduce another dummy IntraIndHolding, which takes the value 1 if at least one of the customers which are cross-held by an institution is in the same SIC2 industry as the supplier. We include this variable since we believe that suppliers and customers belonging to the same industry can affect the decision of the institution to hold both customer and supplier firms' stocks. For example, if a supplier and its customer are in the same industry, the institutions might refrain from holding both stocks in the portfolio due to diversification concerns; at the same time, if an institution's manager has better expertise in a specific industry, the similarity of supplier's and customer's industry might lead the manager to simultaneously hold both stocks in the portfolio. We include IntraIndHolding to see which effect is stronger empirically. We also control for how recognized the supplier is on the market by including the number of analysts that cover a supplier in our study. A supplier is covered by an analyst in a quarter if the analyst reports at least one quarterly or annual report on the firm. We expect supplier firms that are followed by more analysts to be more likely to be held by institutions. We run a Fama-McBeth logistic regression as in Equation (2) to study the effect of an institution's exposure to holding the customers on the decision of the institution to hold the supplier firm's stock in its portfolio.
Since our hypothesis is that institutions with customer knowledge are more likely to hold suppliers after relationships form, we only include in our sample the triplets where the institutions did not hold the supplier in period t − 1. Specifically, we throw out all the triplets for which the supplier has been previously held by an institution, to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a persistent simultaneous cross-holding of customers and suppliers.
Most of our control variables are persistent over time. Therefore, following Gompers and Metrick (2001), we do not report any time-series statistics other than odds ratios across all quarters since the coefficient estimates are not independent across quarters. Instead, we report the number of positive/negative coefficients and the number of statistically significant positive/negative coefficients for all 120 quarterly cross-sectional regressions in Table 6 . Column (1) of the table reports the result for Cus Exp as the key independent variable and column (2) reports the results for Pct Sales as the key independent variable.
[ Table 6 about here] Results in Table 6 show that the coefficients for Cus Exp are positive and statistically significant in 118 out of 120 quarters. This pattern suggests that if an institution has past experience with customers, the institution is more likely to include the supplier firm's stock in its portfolio after relationship establishment. This can also be seen from the average odds ratio of 2.478 for Cus Exp. This means that the odds of an institution holding a supplier firm's stock is 2.478 times higher if the institution holds at least one of the customers of the supplier firm. We find a similar result based on our continuous measure for customersupplier relationships. Our results in column (2) suggest that having a stronger relation with customers improves the odds of a supplier firm's security being held by an institution.
Looking at the results for our control variables, we observe that if a supplier and its customer firms are in the same industry, the institution is less likely to hold them in its portfolio at the same time (e.g., average odds ratio of 0.946 and 0.928 in regressions (1) and (2), respectively). This is consistent with the notion that diversification concerns may prevent institutions from simultaneously holding suppliers and customers that belong to the same industry. We also observe that the coefficient for the number of analysts following a supplier firm is generally positive and statistically significant in most quarters.
16 This pattern suggests that, if more analysts follow a supplier firm, it makes the supplier firm more likely to be held by institutional investors. This result makes intuitive sense since financial institutions gather a significant percentage of their market research data from analyst reports.
As robustness checks, we run the same set of regressions for the full sample, the sample of Quasi-Indexers, and the sample of non Quasi-Indexers as defined by Brian Bushee.
17 While our previous results are robust in all samples, we observe that our effect is stronger among non Quasi-Indexer institutional investors relative to Quasi-Indexers. This pattern is consistent with the notion that institutional investors (e.g., non-indexers) with active strategies are more likely to incorporate network-based information than institutional investors with passive strategies (e.g., indexers). 
Analyst coverage
Research divisions of investment banks (i.e., sell-side analysts) determine their coverages of firms based on demand from their clients, i.e., institutional investors. In the previous subsection, we show that institutional investors, particularly those with customer experience, are more likely to hold suppliers after relationships form. Following the same notion, we argue that, if the customer-supplier relationship results in higher levels of investor recognition for the supplier firms, this would also induce a higher likelihood for financial analysts to initiate coverage of supplier firms. Specifically, we expect that a higher level of demand for
16 Positive in 98 out of 120 quarters and statistically significant in 86 of them based on the result of regression in Column (1).
17 The results are not tabulated in the paper and are available upon request.
18 Quasi-Indexer institutions are characterized as institutions that hold large, diversified portfolios and trade very infrequently (see Bushee (1998) for the detailed characterisation of Quasi-Indexer institutions.) The infrequency of their trades makes them less likely to react to any kind of news including network-based news.
information on the supplier firm would induce more analysts to follow the supplier firm. Further, if an analyst is covering the customer firm, we expect that she is more likely to initiate coverage of the supplier firm relative to other analysts with no customer experience. This is mainly because analysts covering customer firms have a lower cost in discovering the establishment of customer-supplier relationships and understanding the role of suppliers in these relationships. On the other hand, analysts covering customer firms are serving financial institutions holding customer firms and, therefore, are more likely to respond to and cater to the demand of financial institutions with customer experience to invest in stocks of suppliers. Our test is different from the one done by Guan, Wong, and Zhang (2014) where they show analysts have a higher propensity to cover the customer firm if they already cover the supplier. While the tests are in the same spirit, we test the other way around based on the knowledge that customers are much larger firms, and analysts are likely to cover customers much sooner than they cover suppliers.
We form a sample of Supplier, Analyst, Quarter triplets. Our sample consists of 295,904,878 triplets. Similar to our approach in the tests of institutional cross-holdings, our results in this subsection are based on the subsample of triplets where the supplier firms are never covered by an analyst or are only newly covered by an analyst. This reduced sample addresses the concern that our results from the full sample might be driven by persistence in cross-coverage of supplier and customer firms by some analysts. For each of these triplets we define a dummy called Is Covered which takes the value 1 if the analyst reports at least one quarterly or annual financial report on the supplier firm and 0 otherwise. For each triplet we define a dummy variable, Cus Exp, which is set to 1 when at least one of the customers of the supplier firm is covered by the financial analyst, and set to 0 otherwise. We also use Pct Sales, percentage of sales of the supplier to the customer firms, which are covered by the financial analyst in a similar fashion as the one done in equation (1). This variable proxies the strength of the supplier firm's relationship with the customers that are covered by a financial analyst.
To investigate the effect of economic links among firms on supplier firms being covered by a financial analyst we run a Fama-McBeth logistic regression with Is Covered as the dependent variable and Cus Exp or Pct Sales as the independent variable. We control for a host of supplier characteristics in our logistic regression. Since financial analysts generally tend to focus on a specific industry we also include a dummy variable that indicates whether the supplier firm and its customers belong to the same SIC2 industry.
19 We define another dummy variable, IntraIndCov, which takes 1 if the supplier firm and at least one of the customers followed by the financial analyst are in the same industry, and takes 0 otherwise. Since financial analysts usually focus on a specific industry, we expect a supplier and customer being members of the same industry to improve the odds of the supplier being covered by the analyst. Considering that the analyst reports are mainly prepared for use by financial institutions, we also expect the percentage of institutional ownership of the supplier firm's security, Institutional Ownership, to positively affect the odds of the supplier being covered by a financial analyst. For this reason we include the percentage of institutional ownership in our logistic regression. Equation (3) shows our logistic regression:
[ Table 7 about here]
We run the above specification in a subsample where the analyst did not cover the supplier firm in period t-1 to ensure that our result is not contaminated by persistent analyst coverage over time. In other words, our result reflects analysts' decisions of coverage initiation. Table  7 reports the average odds ratio, the number of positive/negative coefficients, as well as number of statistically significant positive/negative coefficients.
20 As expected, Cus Exp loads positively (has an average odds ratio of 13.877) and is statistically significant in all the 84 quarters of our sample. This means being economically linked to a customer firm which is followed by an analyst significantly improves the odds of the supplier firm being covered by the same analyst. Similarly, the coefficients of Pct Sales are statistically significant in 83 out of 84 quarters. This further shows that the strength of the economic link between the supplier and its principal customers proxied by Pct Sales improves the odds of the supplier being covered by a financial analyst. Among other independent variables, a supplier stock's percentage of institutional ownership also loads positively and is positive and statistically significant in 69 out of 84 quarters. This shows that the demand by institutional investors is an important contributing factor in the analysts' decisions to cover a supplier firm. Our test does not provide concrete results on IntraIndCov, i.e. we can't establish that a customer and supplier belonging to the same industry improves the odds of the supplier being covered by the same analyst that covers the supplier firm.
Managers' strategic disclosures
In previous subsections, we show that firms with PCs are likely to be covered by more news articles, more financial analysts, and held by more institutional investors relative to their peers with no PCs. These results provide direct evidence that the product-marketbased economic networks allow suppliers, which are typically much smaller and less wellknown firms, to gain investor recognitions. In this subsection, we examine whether supplier firms' managers understand this effect and take advantage of it by selectively disclosing their relationships with certain principal customers that are likely to improve their investor recognitions. SFAS No. 14 (1976 -1997 requires a firm to disclose the names of all principal customers that take more than 10% of its total sales.
21 In addition to the required disclosure, a lot of supplier firms also voluntarily disclose customer firms that purchase less than 10% of their total sales. 22 Obviously, the voluntary disclosure of principal customers in the latter case is not a random decision, i.e., if the managers of suppliers understand the effect of supplychain relationships on consumer recognition and investor recognition, they will selectively disclose reputable customers only, as compared to the first case where they have to disclose all principal customers without any discretion. Therefore, we predict that reported customers under voluntary disclosure (under the 10% cut-off case) are likely to be more reputable on average than the reported customers under required disclosure. One complication here is that the size of customers affects the likelihood of whether their purchase exceeds the 10% cut-off. If we simply compare the customers under voluntary disclosure and required disclosure without controlling for the relationship strength, the mechanical correlation between the size of customers and the percentage sales in supplier's total sales would dominate, and we would not be able to detect how managers of suppliers selectively disclose customers to maximize consumer and investor recognitions.
To address this complication, we examine 2,411 pairs of customer-supplier relationships before 1998 where the percentage sales to customers in supplier's total sales are bound between 9% and 11%. Under this setting, the relationship strength across all observations is almost at the same level. The difference lies only in the fact that a supplier has to disclose a PC's name when a PC purchases more than 10% of its total sales, and it can selectively disclose a PC's name if it purchases less than the 10% cut-off. Under this research design, the 21 While SFAS No. 131 replaced SFAS No. 14 in 1997, a firm was only required to disclose the "existence" of principal customers that purchase more than 10% of the supplier's total sales. Put differently, a firm could choose to disclose or hide the names of principal customers after 1997 (see Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012)), which would not allow us to carry the test described in this subsection.
22 In our sample of customer-supplier relationships disclosed prior to 1997, 21.30% of the disclosed relationships do not meet the 10% threshold, i.e., they are disclosed on a voluntary basis.
comparison of customers under voluntary (9%-10%) and required (10% to 11%) disclosure is not likely affected by the strength of customer-supplier relationships and the mechanical correlation between the size of customers and the percentage sales in supplier's total sales. Instead, this setting will allow us to detect the different firm characteristics of principal customers in required disclosure and voluntary disclosure, as an outcome incentivized by supplier's maximization of investor recognition.
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Our results are reported in Table 8 . In this test the customer reputation is proxied by media coverage, analyst coverage and institutional holdings, following our discussions in previous three sub-sections. Since all three variables are right-skewed in distribution, we take their logarithm forms as our dependent variables. The key independent variable, Dummy(Pct Sale > 10%), is equal to 1 when the purchase of a customer takes more than 10% of a supplier's total sales and 0 otherwise. To make sure that our results are not contaminated by how a customer chooses its dependent supplier, we incorporate three firm characteristics of the suppliers that have known effects in the relationship establishment and termination: firm size (book value of total sales), profitability (ROA), and leverage (book leverage), as well as the firm characteristics that may impact the coverage of media, analysts and institutional investors as in previous tables. In addition, we also control for both the year-fixed effects and the industry-fixed effects to remove impacts from market-wide and industry-specific common factors. Consistent with our prediction, our results suggest that, while the relationship strength is controlled, customers selectively reported by the suppliers under voluntary disclosure are covered in more news articles, covered by more analysts and held by more institutional investors than customers reported under required disclosure. For example, in terms of media coverage, the number of newspaper articles covering customers under required disclosure is 32.2% lower than that for customers selectively disclosed by suppliers under voluntary disclosure. We find similar results based on analyst coverage (i.e., 11.7% lower) and institutional holdings (i.e., 9.8% lower).
Results in this subsection suggest that the managers of supplier firms understand and exploit the effect of product-market-based economic networks on investor recognition. Specifically, we show that, when managers have a choice, they tend to selectively disclose more reputable customers to achieve a higher level of investor recognition.
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In previous sections, we show that economic networks with reputable customers allow suppliers to gain investor recognition. However, it is not yet clear how suppliers can benefit from the improved investor recognition. In this section, we provide some direct evidence on this issue.
Investor recognition and consumer awareness
There exists a huge overlap between main participants in the financial market, i.e., investors and main participants in the product market, i.e., consumers. Therefore, it is not surprising that improvement in investor recognition is often correlated with the improvement in consumer awareness. Following this notion, we first examine the economic outcome of improved investor recognition in the product market. In this subsection, we focus on two dependent variables: the growth rate of sales to non-principal customers, and the percentage of total advertisement expense in total sales. One can regard the first variable as a measure capturing how investor recognition and consumer awareness affect the sales and revenue of a firm, i.e., once being involved in the supply chain of a reputable customer firm, the supplier firm is more likely to be known and accepted by other clients as the supplier gradually gains media coverage, analyst coverage and institutional holdings. Therefore, the growth rate of sales to non-principal customers is likely to be higher than that of total sales for firms without principal customers.
Using data from Compustat in the period between 1980 to 2009, We formally test this conjecture in Table 9 . In our specification, we include the firm and the year fixed effects in addition to a few common characteristics of supplier firms, to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a trend in the economy or a trend associated with certain firm characteristics. Specifically, the coefficient of PC Dummy represents the within-firm variation in the growth rate of sales to non-principal customers as a consequence of relationship establishment and termination with principal customers, relative to the growth rate of total sales for firms without principal customers. Consistent with our conjecture, our result in Column (1) of Table 9 suggests that when a supplier establishes relationships with principal customers, the growth rate of its sales to non-principal customers is 15.3 percentage points higher than the growth rate of total sales for firms without principal customers.
We next focus on the percentage of total advertisement expense in total sales, which captures how investor recognition and consumer awareness affect the cost side. Advertisement, by its definition, aims to promote investor recognition and consumer awareness of a firm in financial and product markets. Therefore, advertisement and supply chain relationship with reputable customers can be viewed as substitutes in promoting investor recognition and consumer awareness. We expect that firms with principal customers can save their advertisement expense while achieving the same level of sales as their peers without principal customers.
In the test reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 , we focus on a sub-sample of firms whose advertisement expenses are available in Compustat. After controlling for the firm and year fixed effects, we show that the advertisement expense ratio of firms with principal customers is 0.6 percentage point lower than that of firms without principal customers. Given the average advertisement expense ratio is 3.4% in the full sample, this difference can be translated into a 17.6% reduction in advertisement expense for firms with principal customers, while achieving the same level of sales as their peers without principal customers.
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Investor recognition and security issuance
In addition to the product market, investor recognition can also be reflected in various aspects in the financial market. Improved investor recognition will significantly increase the demand of securities, including existing ones, such as stocks and bonds traded in the market, and future ones, such as new bank loans and new security listings. Existing studies have already provided some indirect evidence consistent with the increased demand of securities as an outcome of improved investor recognition for firms establishing relationships with principal customers. For example, Cen, Dasgupta, Elkamhi, and Pungaliya (2014) suggest that firms with long-term principal customers tend to have a lower bank loan spread than other borrowers. Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2014) and Wang and Wang (2014) suggest that firms with principal customers tend to have a lower cost of equity than their peers without principal customers.
Improved investor recognition, as an outcome of relationships with principal customers, not only increases the level of demand (i.e., the quantity) but also changes the "quality" of demand. Specifically, improved investor recognition, exhibited by more extensive media, better analyst coverage and higher institutional holdings, would fundamentally improve the information environment of a firm and mitigate information asymmetry between investors and managers.
We provide two direct tests to examine how improved investor recognition, as an outcome of relationships with principal customers, affects the issuance of new securities. First of all, we examine whether investors react differently while firms with principal customers issue seasoned equity offerings. Next, we examine whether firms with principal customers are more likely to have option listings in the derivative market.
Seasoned equity offering announcement effect
The announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is a classical setting to test the role of information asymmetry in equity issuance (e.g., see studies summarized by two survey papers Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) and Ritter (2003)). If improved investor recognition reduces the level of information asymmetry between investors and managers of issuing firms, our hypothesis above would predict that firms with principal customers are likely to experience less negative announcement returns than their peers without principal customers.
We Here, date T is the date of SEO announcement and [T − k, T + k] refers to a sample period from k trading days before to k trading days after the SEO announcement day. We adopt the sample screening criterion and suggested independent variables in Gao and Ritter (2010) and Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013), and we require that all independent variables must be available. This yields a sample of 5,039 SEOs in our test.
Our result in column (1) suggests that the average SEO announcement return for firms with principal customers, as measured by market model abnormal returns in a period [T − 1, T + 1], is one percentage point higher than the average return of their peers without principal customers. This result is robust irrespective of the choice of benchmark models or the choice of the duration for announcement event windows. Overall, our results suggest that improved investor recognition, as an outcome of relationship establishments with principal customers, not only increases the overall demand level of securities, but also improves the information asymmetry between investors and managers, and fundamentally changes the "quality" of demand.
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Likelihood of option listing
The equity options market is an important venue for price discovery. Option contracts are used by investors as hedging instruments, as well as speculating bets on future changes in their underlying securities (see Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas, 1998) . In this subsection, we examine the influence of a firm's economic network on the likelihood that its equity will be listed on option exchanges, and thereby accessible to option investors. Mayhew and Mihov (2004) study exchanges' option-listing decisions and find that they tend to select stocks that are more visible and receive greater attention as proxied by greater trading volume, size, and volatility. We hypothesize that in addition to stock characteristics documented in Mayhew and Mihov (2004) , firms with significant cash flow links to other firms are more likely to be recognized by option exchanges as being "relevant" to the investing public, making them more likely to be selected for option listing. We test this hypothesis using our customer-supplier relationships. We examine whether supplier firms are more likely to have an option listed on their equity after having established a product-market relationship with a principal customer firm.
We obtain option-related information from Ivey OptionMetrics. We consider the date that options started trading on an equity as the listing date. Our sample consists of 1,453 option listing events on U.S. ordinary common shares from January 1996 to December 2009. We start our analysis in 1996 when Optionmetrics data begins and concludes when our customer-supplier database ends in 2009. The CBOE outlines a list of requirements for stocks that are eligible for option listing. In order to control for the mechanical effect of exchanges' listing rules, our sample consists only of firms that meet the exchanges' requirement for option listing. We summarize the trading requirements of stocks eligible for option listing and how we construct the sample eligible stocks in Appendix A. Figure A .1 in the appendix plots the time series of the universe of stocks eligible for option listing.
We estimate the logit model on a universe of firms that are eligible for option listing. The likelihood that option stock i is selected for option listing is modeled as
where L (List) is the log-odds ratio that the firm i will be selected for option listing during this month. The model is estimated at the firm-month level using option listing events from 1996 through 2010. Table 11 reports the results.
In the first regression model (I), Principal Customer is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm i has disclosed its relationship with a principal costumer firm in the previous year, and zero otherwise. The other independent variables in equation (4) are one-month lagged firm characteristics that have been shown in Mayhew and Mihov (2004) to affect exchanges' option listing decisions. All regressions include the year and the industry fixed effects. Standard errors on the coefficients are clustered at the firm and year levels. We find that the coefficient on Principal Customer is positive and highly significant indicating the likelihood that a firm will have option listing increases after its trading relationship with a principal customer firm is known to the public.
The second regression model (II) in Table 11 reports results with an additional indicator variable, Publicly listed principal customer, which takes the value of one when at least one of the principal-customer firms that trade with firm i is publicly listed. Because exchanges' option listing decisions often bias towards stocks receiving greater investor attention, we expect that firm i's likelihood of being recognized by option exchanges as a relevant firm for option listing would increase if it trades with a publicly listed principal-customer firm. This is exactly what we find. The coefficient on Publicly listed principal customer is positive and significant. Its magnitude is almost twice as large as that on Principal Customer suggesting the likelihood that a firm will have an option listed increases tremendously if it is known as an important supplier to a large publicly traded firm.
In the third regression model (III), we define the strength of a trading relationship as the percentage of supplier firm's sales to their corporate customers. We therefore do not limit our analysis to the network impact of principal-customer firms. Pct Sale to customer is the average percentage of sales that firm i makes to each corporate customer in the previous year, relative to its total sales. A high value of Pct Sale to customer indicates that the supplier firm engages in significant trading relationships with other firms in its network. They are, therefore, likely considered as relevant firms for option listing. Overall, the results in this section highlight the important of firms' relationships in the product-market network in influencing exchanges' option listing decisions.
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Conclusions
This paper examines the role of the economic network as an important channel through which a firm gains investor recognition. In the proposed channel, firms do not gain visibility by increasing communications with their potential investors, e.g., advertisement and IR programs, but rather through establishing supply-chain relationships with large and wellknown customer firms. We identify important relationships between customer-supplier firms in the product market using the Compustat Segment Customer File from 1980 to 2009. The relationships reported in the database are disclosed by dependent supplier firms, which are usually smaller and less well-known than their customer firms. Utilizing this empirical setting, we show that relationships established by supplier firms in the product market significantly impact their firms' visibility, investor followings, and operating environment.
Using the number of newspaper articles written on a firm in the Factiva database as a proxy for visibility, we show that press coverage on a supplier firm increases immediately after it discloses a relationship with a well-known customer firm. Relatedly, we find that the likelihood that an institutional investor (analyst) will cross-hold (cross-cover) both the customer and its dependent supplier firms surges after the customer-supplier relationship forms. Besides establishing evidence that a small and young firm can increase its visibility and investor base through the product-market relationship, we show that managers are cognizant of this channel of recognition transfer. Using the marginal cut-off in the disclosure requirement enforced by FASB, we show that customer firms that are voluntarily disclosed have greater news coverage, are held by more institutional investors, and are covered by more analysts than customer firms disclosed under compulsory disclosure.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on how firms can increase their visibility and investor following by highlighting the role of economic network as a channel that can substantially improve the degree of investor recognition, especially for small and young firms in the product market. While recent studies find that managers can successfully improve their firm's visibility and shareholder base through advertising and investor relations programs, such approaches may not be financially feasible for small and young firms. On the other hand, we show that a supplier firm can significantly reduce their advertising expenses and cost of equity issuance when it discloses a trading relationship with a well-known customer firm. Overall, we find that relationships between firms in the product market are an important channel for recognition diffusion and provide supplier firms with benefits beyond those quantifiable through sales. observations. We obtain our data on financial institutions from Thomson Reuters 13f dataset. Using Brian Bushee's classification of financial institutions, we identify the institution as quasi-indexers and non quasi-indexers The mean, median, and standard deviation within each group are reported. Panel B reports the mean, median and standard deviation of firm characteristics for all firms, principal customers and dependent suppliers. For each fiscal year the number of news articles per year, market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, dividend yield, return on assets, advertisement share of sales, book leverage, and inclusion in the S&P500 index are presented. For each quarter the number of analysts following the firm and percentage of institutional ownership of the firm's stock are demonstrated. Last, for each month, we show volatility of monthly returns during the past two years, turnover, age, buy and hold return for the previous three months, and buy and hold return for the previous year excluding the last three months. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix C. Table 2 . Increase in news coverage after PC establishment: This table presents the average changes of news coverage on supplier firms between the k th year after and the year before the principal customer relationship is established. N k (N −1 ) denotes the number of news articles in the k th year after (the year before) the PC establishment. The mean of N −1 is 59.27. The t-statistic of testing H 0 : Table 3 . Excess news coverage from all news sources and PC duration: This table presents the results of regressing excess news coverage on the duration of the PC relationship. We conduct propensity-score matching for each firm year in our PC sample based on two-digit SIC and total assets. The excess news coverage is defined as ln [(1 + N k 
the supplier firm's percentage change of news coverage between the k th year after and the year before the PC establishment. Similarly, ln [(1 + N mf,k )/(1 + N mf,−1 )] is the news coverage change for the matched non-PC firm. VW-duration (EW-duration) is a sales-weighted (equally-weighted) duration measure based on sales to all principal customers. Other control variables are defined in Appendix C. We include industry-and year-fixed effects in all specifications. The t-stats reported in parentheses are calculated using firm-level clustered standard errors. The statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Table 5 . Customer-related excess news coverage and PC duration: This table presents the results of regressing customer-related excess news coverage on the duration of the PC relationship. For each customer-supplier pair, we count the supplier's news articles that contain the customer's name as customer-related news coverage. We define the customer-related excess news coverage similar to the previous table with the only difference being that customer-related excess news coverage is at the customer-supplier pair level. The duration is also at the customer-supplier level. Famous Customer is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the customer's news coverage from top sources falls in the top 5% of all customers, and 0 otherwise. All the other explanatory variables are defined the same as in Table 3 . We include industry-and year-fixed effects in all specifications. The t-stats reported in parentheses are calculated using suppliercustomer pair level clustered standard errors. The statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) Our observations are organized based on every possible triplet of Supplier, Institution, Quarter in our sample period. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes 1 if the institution reports holding the supplier firm's stock at that quarter, and 0 otherwise. Cus Exp (Customer Experience) dummy equals to 1 if the institution reports holding at least one of the customers of the supplier firm during the quarter, and 0 otherwise. P ct Sales t is percentage of sales of a supplier to all its customers that are cross-held by the institution. Inst Char is a vector that contains institutional characteristics (Institution Size and Average Holding Age). Sup Char is a vector that contains supplier characteristics.
IntraIndHold dummy is set to 1 when the supplier and at least one of the customers that are cross-held by the institution belong to the same 2-digit SIC code. Detailed definitions of all control variables are provided in Appendix C. Importantly, the results tabulated here are based on the sub-sample of triplets for which the supplier is either never held by the institution or only newly held by the institution. We report the average odds ratio, the number of positive and negative coefficients, and the number of statistically significant (at the 90% level) positive and negative coefficients (in parentheses) for all cross-sectional regressions.
Newly-held or Never-held Subsample Our observations are organized based on every possible triplet of Supplier, Analyst, Quarter. The dependent variable, Is Covered, is a dummy that takes 1 if the analyst covers the supplier at that quarter, and 0 otherwise. Cus Exp (Customer Experience) dummy is equal to 1 if the analyst covers at least one customer of the supplier firm during the quarter. P ct Sales t is the percentage of sales of a supplier to customers that are covered by the analyst. Sup Char is a vector that contains supplier characteristics. Here, we report the result of the regression over the subset of suppliers that were never covered by the analyst or were only newly covered by the analyst. We also control for the similarity of the customer and supplier industry by introducing the IntraIndCov dummy which takes 1 when the supplier and one of its cross-covered customers belong to the same industry as identified by the Institutional Investor Magazine and 0 otherwise. Column (1) reports the results using the Cus Exp as the key independent variable, and column (2) reports the results using P ct Sales as the key independent variable. Detailed definitions of all control variables are provided in Appendix C. We report the average odds ratio, the number of positive and negative coefficients, and the number of statistically significant (at the 90% level) positive and negative coefficients (in parentheses) for all cross-sectional regressions.
Never Covered or Newly Covered Subsample This table reports the difference in customer characteristics while the relationship strength is around the margin of disclosure requirement. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(3) are defined as follows: ln(1+Num News) is the logarithm of one plus the total number of news covering the customer in year t; ln(1+Num Analysts) is the logarithm of one plus the number of analysts covering the customer firm at the end of year t; and ln(1+%InstOwn) is the logarithm of one plus the percentage institutional ownership at the end of year t. In this test we only focus on the customer-supplier relationships where the percentage sales to the customer in the supplier's total sales are between 9% and 11%. When this percentage is equal to or higher than 10%, Dummy(Pct Sale >10%) equals 1; when this percentage is below 10%, Dummy(Pct Sale >10%) equals 0. Other control variables, including the natural logarithm of the supplier's total sales (Supplier ln(Total Sales)), supplier's return on assets (Supplier ROA) and supplier's book leverage (Supplier Book Leverage) reflect information for the fiscal year end t − 1. Detailed definitions of control variables are provided in Appendix C. We include the year fixed effects and industry fixed effects in all specifications. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors after the adjustments for clustering at the firm and the year levels. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 9 . Customer-supplier relationships and economic outcomes:
The sample period for this test is from 1980 to 2009. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is the growth rate of sales to non-principal customers (i.e., growth rates of total sales minus sales to principal customers) and the dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the advertisement expense scaled by total sales. Both dependent variables reflect information for year t + 1. The key independent variable, PC Dummy, is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has at least one principal customer in year t, and zero otherwise. All independent variables, which are defined in Appendix C, reflect information for year t. We incorporate year-fixed effects and industry-fixed (based on SIC 2-digit classification) effects in Columns (1) and (3). We incorporate year fixed effects and firm-fixed effects in Columns (2) and (4). T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and the year levels. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 10 . Customer-supplier relationships and the announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings: The sample period for this test is from 1980 to 2009. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the SEO announcement effects based on market model, and the ones in columns (3) and (4) are CARs based on the Fama-French and Carhart four factor model. We investigate two window periods: (T − 1, T + 1) and (T − 2, T + 2), where T − k denotes k trading days before the announcement date T and T + k denotes k trading days after the announcement date. The key independent variable, PC Dummy, is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has at least one principal customer, and zero otherwise. All independent variables, which are defined in Appendix C, reflect information corresponding to the previous fiscal year end before the SEO announcements. We incorporate both the year-and the industry-fixed effects in all specifications. T-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors after the adjustments for clustering at the year levels. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) CAR (T-1, T+1) CAR (T-2, T+2) CAR (T-1, T+1) CAR (T-2, T+2)
MKT Table 11 . Likelihood of option listing: We estimate the firm's probability of having option listed based on the logistic regression model in (4).This table summarizes the results. The dependent variable in the logistic regression is the dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has an option listed in the current month, and 0 otherwise. The estimation sample consists of U.S. firms in 1996-2009 that meet option listing requirements according to the NYSE AMEX Rule 915. We report results from three regression specifications examining different proxies used to measure the strength of the principal customer relationship. In columns (1) and (2), the strength of a firm's economic network is measured by its relationship with a principal-customer firm. We define firm i as having a principal customer, i.e. economic trading partner, if one of the customer firms that it trades with accounts for 10% or more of its total sales in the previous year. PC Dummy is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i disclosed its economic relationship with a principal costumer firm in the previous year, and zero otherwise. Publicly listed principal customer is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i has at least one principal-customer firm which is publicly listed, and zero otherwise. In column (3), the strength of firm i's economic network is measured by its total sales to their disclosed customer firms. Pct Salesis the percentage of sales that firm i makes to all corporate customers in the previous year, relative to the total sales. We include several one-month lagged firm-level characteristics that have been shown to influence exchanges' option listing decisions (see Mayhew and Mihov (2004) ). Detailed definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix C. Industry-and year-fixed effects are included in all specifications. Robust t-statistics, clustered at both the firm and year levels are reported in brackets below each estimate. Number of observations refers to the number of firm-months used in the estimation. We report the pseudo R-squared for each regression model. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Probability of option listing
(1) (2) 
